Experimental and empirical evidence documents instances where the presence of an inferior option in a menu increases the attractiveness of the better options from that menu and thus distorts the normative ranking across menus. We analyze the case when besides this so called context e¤ects bias there is also a concern for ‡exibility in the spirit of the literature initiated by Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) . Since the context e¤ects bias and the desire for ‡exibility both increase the inclination of a decision maker to choose larger menus, the analysis allows the disentangling of the e¤ect of the behavioral bias from the e¤ect of the rational desire from ‡exibility. We …nd a weak condition on the set of ex post preferences under which the two e¤ects are identi…able. We show that our representation is essentially unique. From a pedagogical viewpoint, our paper provides a novel methodology of identifying probabilities on the state space of subjective uncertainty introduced by Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) when this state space is in…nite. This method renders the in…nite state space essentially …nite with respect to a certain salient property.
Introduction
Numerous observations from the marketing and psychology literature document the existence of a so called context-e¤ects bias as suggested by the following experiment presented in Simonson and Tversky (1992) . The participants in the experiment were asked to choose between two substitute products, tissues and towels. Two versions of the experiment were designed. One superior brand of towels and one superior brand of tissues were included in both versions. In addition, in one version of the experiment the participants were o¤ered with one inferior brand of towels, while in the other they were o¤ered with one inferior brand of tissues. The results of the experiment showed that the market share of the superior quality brand was signi…cantly higher when the inferior quality brand belonged to the same category. This example shows how the presence of an inferior option in a menu may make the better bundles of that menu appear more attractive by comparison, and thus distort the normative ranking of the available options. 1 This is a pattern of behavior inconsistent with the standard model of rationality, which posits that products which are never chosen for consumption should not in ‡uence the decision maker's choices.
In a recent paper, Barbos (2010) studies a model of choice from categories, or menus, consistent with the above experimental evidence. Since menus are the objects of choice that reveal an individual's desire for ‡exibility, as a natural extension of the certainty model whose axiomatic foundations are provided in that paper, we study here the case when besides the context-e¤ects bias, there is also a concern for ‡exibility in the spirit of the literature initiated by Kreps (1979) and Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) (henceforth DLR(2001) ). More precisely, we analyze the case in which we allow for the presence of some underlying uncertainty between the moment of the choice of the menu and the moment of the choice of a speci…c option from within the menu. Allowing for uncertainty between the two stages makes sense especially in those applications in which there is some cost of switching between menus and the choice of the speci…c element from the menu is made either signi…cantly later or repeatedly over a long period of time. In these cases, when choosing the menu the decision maker has to contemplate various potential realizations of his future preferences and thus, the usual intuition behind the notion of subjective tastes (Kreps (1979) , DLR (2001)) applies here as well. 2 Since both the context e¤ects bias and the desire for ‡exibility increase the inclination of a decision maker to choose a particular menu when that menu is expanded, the analysis in this paper allows disentangling the e¤ect of the behavioral bias from the e¤ect of the rational desire for ‡exibility in evaluating preferences over menus. We show that our representation is essentially unique.
As a motivating example, consider a family that contemplates buying a hybrid car. Before going to the dealership, the husband uses the internet to check the available options presented by the two leading brands, Toyota Prius and Honda Insight. He …nds out that the Prius comes in three trims, which we denote by x 0 , x 1 and x 2 , while the Insight comes in just one trim, denoted by y. If the husband were to evaluate these options in isolation, he would have the following normative preference: y
x 2 x 1 x 0 . However, in line with the Simonson and Tversky experiment, assume that the husband exhibits a context e¤ects bias. In particular, assume that the behavioral bias induces the following ranking of categories: 3 fx 2 ; x 0 g fyg fx 1 ; x 0 g fx 2 g fx 1 g fx 0 g
(1)
Here, following the de…nition and interpretation of categories from Barbos (2010) , we write for instance fx 2 ; x 0 g fyg fx 2 g fx 0 g to mean that the individual would choose x 2 if he were presented with the set of options x 0 , x 2 and y, where x 0 , x 2 belong to the same category, but would choose y if the inferior option x 0 was not present.
Given the ranking in (1) , the individual should choose to go to the Toyota dealership and the family would purchase the option x 2 . However, the husband is aware that once in the dealership, the wife will become interested in the decision process, will virtually impose her will and the family will purchase the car that she prefers. The husband is sure that his wife will not be interested in x 0 , but is unsure as to which option she would prefer out of x 1 and x 2 . Given the husband's ranking fx 2 ; x 0 g fyg fx 1 ; x 0 g, his ranking of the categories fx 2 ; x 1 ; x 0 g and fyg will depend on the particular subjective belief that he has about the events that the wife would choose x 1 or x 2 . In this case, it makes sense thus to see the initial selection of a dealership as a choice between menus and the subsequent selection of a trim as a choice from the menu after some uncertainty is resolved. Thus, if one regards the household as an economic agent, introducing uncertainty in a model that attempts to describe its behavior is necessary. 45 For this model, following Kreps (1979) , we will identify a menu with an ex ante observable action that after some subjective uncertainty is resolved will make a certain set of outcomes available ex post. The observability of these ex ante actions renders the preference over menus a revealed preference; thus, we can take this to be our primitive in the uncertainty setting. The reference dependent representation under uncertainty that we will axiomatize is the following:
where S is a state space capturing the subjective uncertainty with a positive measure over S, U (z; s) is the ex post state utility of option z in state s and 2 (0; 1) is a parameter that measures the strength of the behavioral bias. 6 The space S will satisfy an additional condition that will specify that the decision maker does not reverse or almost reverse his ex ante preferences. Thus, while we allow for the presence of uncertainty, we do restrict attention to those applications in which there exists some underlying phenomenon that makes the ex ante preferences relevant for the ex post stage. The behavioral bias is identi…able only in those applications in which this condition is satis…ed. We study the behavioral implications of both a …nite and an in…nite state space S. An in…nite state space appears, for instance, in models in which the individual has a continuous distribution of the ex post tastes over the characteristics of the available options. Now, it is straightforward to see that (2) can be written as: 
Thus, the preference for a menu is determined by the combination of a normative component and a behavioral bias component. The normative component is the weighted average of the utilities of the normatively best options from the menu in each of the possible ex post states. The weighting factors are the subjective probabilities of these states. The bias component is the weighted average of the di¤erence in utilities between the normatively ex post best options 6 Note that the reference point is the ex ante least preferred option from within the menu. An alternative generalization of the certainty representation in Barbos (2010) , would have a reference point bias for each state. In this case, the utility of a menu would be the weighted sum of the di¤erences between the utilities of the ex post best and ex post worst options in each state. While this would be an interesting model to axiomatize, as the car buying example provided above suggests, the context e¤ects bias distorts choice at the menu selection stage. It is therefore more compelling to consider that the agent compares the ex post better options with the option that is the least preferred when the behavioral bias a¤ects choice. Ultimately, though, the only way one can identify which model characterizes an agent's behavioral in a particular application is by testing which set of axioms are consistent with his choices. This paper provides a test for the representation de…ned in (2). in the menu and the normatively ex ante worst element in the menu, x 0 . The second component is a measure of the increase in the relative attractiveness of the better options from a menu generated by the presence of the inferior option against which they are compared.
We show that the main axiom that captures the departure from rationality in the certainty model from Barbos(2010) is almost su¢cient to deliver the context e¤ects representation under uncertainty when added to the standard axioms from DLR (2001). More precisely, the axiom is su¢cient for the case of a …nite state space. When the state space is in…nite, for the behavioral bias to be identi…able, an additional axiom is required. This axiom imposes the existence of a pair consisting of a menu A and a lottery y such that y does not provide any ex post ‡exibility to a decision maker that was faced initially with the menu A. This axiom is equivalent to the condition that the decision maker does not reverse or almost reverse his ex ante preferences. Under this assumption, the e¤ect of the behavioral bias can then be measured by studying the e¤ect of expanding the menu A with the lottery y. As the ex post preferences are not observable, the existence of this pair is imposed through some ex ante behavioral implications. 7 Finally, from a pedagogical point of view, our paper contributes to the literature by providing an original method of identifying probabilities on the state space of subjective uncertainty introduced by DLR (2001) when this state space is in…nite. This method uses the compactness property of the state space to construct a …nite cover of this space. For the proof of su¢ciency of the axioms, the cover is constructed so that an element of strictly positive measure with some desired properties can be extracted. For the proof of necessity of the axioms, which in the case of our representation is not trivial, we construct the cover so that we can partition the state space into a …nite number of subsets with states sharing a common property. Essentially, this method renders the in…nite state space …nite with respect to a certain condition and thus allows employing the argument from the case of a …nite state space. To our knowledge, Sarver (2008) is only one other axiomatic exercise in the literature on preferences over menus to put structure on the subjective state space derived by DLR (2001) when the state space is in…nite. 8 Preferences over menus were considered for the …rst time by Kreps (1979) . He identi…ed an act with the choice of a set of future options out of which at a later stage the decision maker chooses his most preferred element. He interpreted the agent's preference for the ‡exibility o¤ered by the menu as being generated by some underlying subjective uncertainty that will be resolved between the moment when the choice of the menu is made and the moment when the choice from the menu is made. This allowed him to show that under su¢ciently weak conditions, the decision maker behaves as if the uncertainty were described by a subjective state space, where each state is identi…ed with an ex post subjective utility. The preferences that we study in this paper belong to the class of preferences modeled by DLR (2001). DLR (2001) considered menus of lotteries instead of menus of deterministic bundles; this allowed restricting the ex post state utilities to be of the expected utility form. This addressed the issue of the nonuniqueness of the subjective state space characteristic to the Kreps representation. Also, unlike Kreps(1979) , DLR (2001) allowed for subjective states of negative measure to capture not only a preference for ‡exibility but also a preference for commitment. There is a large body of literature that built on the class of preferences introduced by DLR (2001). Gul and Pesendorfer(2001) were the …rst to give meaning to the abstract subjective states derived in earlier papers. Thus, they imposed conditions on preferences such that the resulting state space consists of one state of negative measure representing a temptation preference and one state of positive measure representing the second period preferences which combine a normative preference and the temptation preference. This combination of normative and temptation preferences has been implemented in the meantime in other papers to model various behavioral biases, such as non-bayesian updating, cognitive dissonance, etc. For examples, see Epstein and Kopylov (2007) or Kopylov and Noor (2009) . In another direction, the preference for commitment has been interpreted in Sarver(2008) not as being driven by the presence of temptation but by the anticipation of regret.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we present the basic assumptions common to most of the literature on preferences over menus. Also, in Section 2 we de…ne the representation in our model and compare it with other representations that built on the DLR (2001) framework. In section 3 we present our additional axioms and the main results which state the equivalence between the axioms and the representations, while section 4 concludes the paper. Most proofs are relegated to the Appendix.
The Framework and the Representations
Let Z be a …nite space of outcomes or prizes and let (Z) denote the set of probability measures on Z endowed with the topology of convergence in distribution. Let K( (Z)) denote the collection of all nonempty closed subsets of (Z). Endowing K( (Z)) with the Hausdor¤ topology we make it a compact metric space. Elements of (Z) will be called lotteries and will be denoted by x; y; z; etc., while the typical elements K( (Z)) will be called menus and will be denoted by A; B; C; etc. The decision maker is assumed to have a revealed preference relation over the elements in K( (Z)). For any two menus A; B 2 K( (Z)) and any 2 [0; 1], de…ne their convex combination as A + (1 )B fz 2 (Z) : z = x + (1 )y, for some x 2 A and y 2 Bg. To avoid complicating the exposition to address the uninteresting case in which is trivial, we assume that there exist x; y 2 (Z) such that fxg fyg.
We will impose throughout the paper the following standard axioms on the preference. For a detailed interpretation and motivation of these axioms, see DLR(2001) .
is a complete and transitive binary relation.
Axiom 2 (Continuity). For any A 2 K( (Z)), the upper and lower contour sets, fB 2 K( (Z)) : B Ag and fB 2 K( (Z)) : B Ag, are closed in the Hausdor¤ metric topology.
Axiom 3 (Independence). For all A; B; C 2 K( (Z)) and any 2 (0; 1),
The representation in (2) is a particular case of the additive expected utility representation as de…ned and axiomatized for the …rst time by DLR (2001). We will also frequently refer to it throughout as the DLR representation.
De…nition 4 An additive expected utility representation of is a nonempty possibly in…nite set S, a state dependent utility function U : (Z) S ! R and a …nitely additive signed Borel measure on S, such that V : K( (Z)) ! R, de…ned for all A 2 K( (Z)) by
is continuous and represents and each U ( ; s) is an expected utility function in that for each s 2 S there exists u s : Z ! R such that U (z; s) = z u s .
Following DLR (2001), we allow for the uncertainty to be completely subjective. Thus, besides allowing for a subjective distribution over the ex post contingencies as in standard Savage type models, we also allow for the actual space of ex post contingencies to be subjective. See DLR (2001) for further details. Therefore, a state in the above representation can be uniquely identi…ed by the corresponding ex post state utility.
For the case when the state space S is …nite the representation can be equivalently written as:
where S + fs 2 S : (s) > 0g and S fs 2 S : (s) < 0g and u s ( ) j (s)jU ( ; s). In writing the above we used the fact that the measure over states and the state utility are not separately identi…ed in models of state-dependent utility, so they can be combined together.
Note that the above de…nition allows the measure over the states to be signed. DLR (2001) call positive states and negative states, the states in the support of the positively signed and respectively negatively signed components of . 9 Intuitively, as stated in DLR (2001), the positive states would reveal the agent's desire for ‡exibility, while the negative states would reveal his desire for commitment. In our paper, unlike the other papers building on the DLR (2001) framework, the agent is assumed to not have any kind of commitment issues. Therefore we assume throughout an additional axiom on preferences called Monotonicity, which imposes that weakly larger sets in the partial order given by inclusion be weakly preferred by the decision maker. 10 This is a condition consistent with the assumption of the agent not experiencing commitment problems. The e¤ects of imposing Monotonicity on preferences are the following. Firstly, the axiom insures that the measure over the states from the representation is everywhere positive. Secondly, it allows us to obtain a stronger property of the measure, that is -additivity instead of …nite additivity as in DLR (2001). Finally, Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini and Sarver (2007) show that if Monotonicity is not imposed, the Continuity axiom as presented above needs to be strenghtened to an axiom which they call Strong Continuity in order to get the additive expected utility representation with a signed measure. The additional condition on preferences that is needed delivers the Lipschitz continuity of the representation. Here, since we do assume Monotonicity, we may impose the weaker continuity condition given by the Continuity axiom presented above.
We will also consider the case when the state space from the DLR representation is …nite. A necessary and su¢cient condition to obtain a …nite state space was found in Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2009). The authors call this additional axiom Finiteness. 11 9 Chatterejee and Krishna (2009a) present conditions that characterize the sign of a state in in terms of its representation as an integral with respect to a signed measure and show that in the case of an in…nite state space, a state can be both positive and negative. 10 The Monotonicity axiom is part of the axiomatization of the preference for ‡exibility in Kreps (1979) . 11 hull(A) = fz 2 Z : z = P k i=1 i z i with i 0, P k i=1 i = 1 and z i 2 Ag denotes the convex hull of a set A.
Axiom 7 (Finiteness) Every menu A 2 K( (Z)) has a …nite critical set, where a critical set of a menu A is a any set A 0 such that for all B with A 0 hull(B) hull(A) we have B A.
Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2009) prove the following result. 
Throughout the rest of the paper we use s 2 S N to refer both to a second period contingency as well as to the normalized expected utility function representing the preferences in that state. Thus, the utility of x 2 (Z) in state s will be U (x; s) = x s = X N k=1
x k s k , where s = (s 1 ; :::; s N ) 2 S N is the normalized expected utility function that represents the state s preferences. Note now that the restrictions of the Weak Order, Continuity and Independence axioms to (Z) imply by standard results the existence of an expected utility function v( ) that represents the restriction of to (Z). Sarver(2008) shows that since S N contains the normalization of any a¢ne function on (Z), there exists s 2 S N and > 0 such that
x k s k for all x 2 (Z). 12 We de…ne now formally a normalized representation of the preferences exhibiting the reference point bias. As mentioned in the Introduction, we assume that in the second period, after the uncertainty is resolved the decision maker cannot reverse or almost reverse his ex ante tastes. Denote the ball of radius " around s where " > 0 and s 2 S by N " (s) fs 0 2 S : d(s 0 ; s) < "g where d( ; ) is the usual Euclidean metric in R N . De…nition 9 Let Z be any …nite set. A normalized reference-dependent representation under uncertainty of consists of a nonempty possibly in…nite measurable set S S N , a Borel measure on S N , with S being the unique support 13 of and a constant 2 (0; 1), such that
represents the preference ;
(ii) the utility of a lottery x 2 (Z) in state s 2 S is x s;
(iii) if s 2 S N is the normalized utility that represents the restriction of to (Z) then there exists " > 0 such that S S N nN " ( s ). 14 We emphasize that besides S and which are the usual elements in a normalized DLR representation, the parameter and the restriction (iii) on the set of ex post utility functions will also be deduced from preference as a part of the representation.
Note that the functional form in (8) for V ( ) can be rewritten as:
and thus our representation is indeed a particular form of an additive expected utility representation with all states having associated a positive measure. The condition (iii) on the set of ex post utilities allows identi…cation of the behavioral bias modeled by our representation with the reference point bias. Note that (8) implies that the ex ante preferences over singletons are represented by the utility function v(x)
Z S (x s) (ds). By inspecting (9), it is clear that the preferences represented by v (x) Z S (x s) (ds) could constitute just another ex post state in a DLR(2001) framework with the property that these ex post preferences are exactly the reverse of the ex ante preferences over singletons. We rule out this possibility by making the arguably reasonable assumption that in the second period, after the uncertainty is resolved, the decision maker cannot reverse or almost reverse his ex ante tastes. This is done by the identi…cation of the term max x2A Z S (x s) (ds) from the equivalent representation in (9) with the impact of a reference-point bias and by the condition (iii) from De…nition 9.
In the remaining of this Section we present the particular structure imposed on the ex post states of the DLR representation by various papers that built on that framework to underline the di¤erences between these representations and ours. 15 Note …rstly from (9) that in our model there exist no negative states and there exists one positive state of strictly positive measure having the corresponding utility a negative a¢ne transformation of the utilities of the rest of the states.
In Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) the equivalent DLR representation is the following:
where u 1 is the utility that represents the second period preference relation and u 2 is the temptation component of these second period preferences. Therefore, in this representation there is one positive state and one negative state with no particular mathematical relation between them.
In Sarver (2008) the equivalent DLR representation of his regret representation is:
where K 0. Thus, in this case there is a number, possibly in…nite of negative states and one positive state whose corresponding state utility is a positive a¢ne transformation of the utilities corresponding to the negative states. 16 The equivalent representation from Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2009) of what they call the temptation representation is:
which is a generalization of the one from Gul and Pesendorfer (2001) in the sense that it assumes multiple ex post states and for each ex post state multiple ex post temptations. This represen-tation has a number of positive states and for each positive state a number of corresponding negative states with some underlying structure among them. Unlike the other representations, in Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2009) the state space is assumed to be …nite.
The Axioms and the Main Results
As noted before, the representation in (8) is a special type of an additive expected utility representation with a positive measure. Thus, it will be necessary that the preference satisfy Weak Order, Continuity, Independence and Monotonicity. Two additional axioms will be su¢cient for the preference to have a reference-dependent representation when combined with the above four axioms. The …rst additional axiom captures the departure from the standard model of rationality that we study in this paper.
Axiom 10 (CEB: Context-E¤ects Bias) : For any pair (
Axiom CEB states that if the decision maker has the set of possible choices A expanded by adding an option, say a singleton fxg, which from an ex ante point of view is strictly worse that the rest of the elements in the menu, then the agent will strictly prefer the new expanded set A [ fxg to the initial one A. The motivation for this preference is given by the fact that the inferior lottery x will be chosen as the new reference point and thus the overall attractiveness of the better options from the menu will increase. Note that since the preferences in the text of the axiom are strict, Axiom CEB imposes that the agent has a strict preference for menus having additional strictly inferior outcomes. This corresponds to the restriction that > 0 in the representation in (8) .
Axiom CEB provides the departure from the standard model of rationality as suggested by the presence of a behavioral bias. However, when allowing for an in…nite state space this departure is identi…ed only when combined with the Axiom CEB-2 presented below. This is because, when allowing for the presence of uncertainty, it may happen that an ex ante inferior option still provides some ex post ‡exibility to the elements of a set, and thus the pattern of choice suggested by Axiom CEB is valid without assuming any reference point bias. In order to have a departure from the standard rational preferences, there must exist at least one set A and at least one lottery y strictly worse from an ex ante point of view to all elements of A such that in any ex post state there exists an element in A that is at least as preferred as y. Then, imposing Axiom CEB to the sets A and A [ fyg would provide the departure. Now, in the case of a …nite state space, the pair (A; y) with the desired properties always exists when we maintain the assumption that the second period preferences cannot be exactly the reversed ex ante preferences. 17 In the case of an in…nite state space, the existence of such a pair (A; y) will be imposed by Axiom CEB-2 below. As the ex post preferences are not observable, this is done by imposing a natural implication of the existence of the pair (A; y) on the ex ante preferences. Before presenting Axiom CEB-2 we will make a remark that suggests that imposing axiomatically the existence of such a pair is correct when the preferences that we are studying are represented by a utility function as in (8) .
Remark 11
When the preferences admit a normalized reference-dependent representation as in (8), there exist a set A 2 K( (Z)) with A int( (Z)) and a lottery y 2 (Z) such that: (i) for any x 2 A we have x s > y s and (ii) for any s 2 S there exists x 2 A such that x s > y s.
Proof. See Appendix A1 for some notation on support functionals and then Lemma 29.
The second non standard axiom for the case of an in…nite subjective state space is the following.
Axiom 12 (CEB-2): There exists a set A 2 K( (Z)) with A int( (Z)) and a set B 2 K( (Z)) with A B and fxg fyg for all x 2 A and some y 2 B, such that for all lotteries
To see the motivation for this axiom, consider a pair fA; yg such that y does not provide any ex post ‡exibility to A. Then, on the one hand, by choice of y, it provides no ex post ‡exibility to the set A [ fzg. On the other, since y is weakly preferred to z from an ex ante point of view, y will not be the reference point chosen from A [ fy; zg. Since under no circumstances the agent would choose y over the elements in A [ fzg, he is as well o¤ having at hand the menu A [ fzg as he is having the larger menu A [ fy; zg. Therefore, we impose the required indi¤erence. The condition that B is some superset of A instead of A [ fyg is a nonessential weakening of the axiom meant only to simplify the notation in the proof of the main theorem when we characterize a menu by the corresponding support functionals.
We mention that while the condition from the text of the axiom is valid for an in…nite number of sets in K( (Z)), we do not impose this condition to hold for all these sets simply because there may exist A 2 K( (Z)) such that there exists no lottery y = 2 A that does not provide any ex post ‡exibility to A. Also, we do not impose the indi¤erence of the sets constructed as in the text of Axiom CEB-2, but for all B that contain a lottery y such that y is strictly less preferred to all elements of A from the ex ante point of view. This is because, as mentioned earlier, a lottery which is ex ante inferior to all x 2 A could turn out ex post to be better to all elements of A and then B [ fzg A [ fzg. The weak restriction imposed in the text of the Axiom that the condition is valid for at least one pair (A; B) is su¢cient to obtain the desired representation for all sets due to the additional structure provided by the EU form of the ex post utilities. Note also that we impose that an element of B be strictly worse than all elements of A. Without this condition, it is clear that the axiom would not have any bite since we could always let B be exactly the set A. Now we are ready to state the main result of the paper:
The preference has a representation as in (8) if and only if it satis…es Weak Order, Continuity, Independence, Monotonicity, Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2.
Proof. See Appendix A1 and Appendix A2.
While the complete proof of Theorem 13 can be found in the Appendix, we present here for intuition a sketch of this proof. We start by showing how the argument goes if the state space S were …nite. This reveals how Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2 work to give us the representation.
Weak Order, Continuity, Independence and Monotonicity imply that the preference over menus has the following representation, with a positive measure:
Denote by v( ) the restriction of V ( ) to singletons. Thus, v represents the ex ante preference over lotteries and by (13) 
. Now, recall that the representation in (8) is a particular case of a DLR representation in which the utility associated with one of the states is a negative a¢ne transformation of the utilities associated with the rest of the states. We will prove here that under Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2, the representation in (13) must have exactly that structure on the ex post states, which comes down to showing that s 2 S. The rest of the proof consists of showing that given that structure, the representation in (13) can be written as in (8) . This second part of the proof is just simple algebra manipulations and its presentation is relegated to the Appendix.
Let A 2 int(K( (Z))) and B 2 K( (Z)) be as in the de…nition of Axiom CEB-2, that is A B and fxg fyg for all x 2 A and some y 2 B. Then by Axiom CEB and Monotonicity we have B A; using the representation in (13) it follows that:
Since the measure is positive, (14) implies that there must exist s 0 2 S such that max . Assume by contradiction that there is no such state utility as the one that we are looking for, that is L s (y) \ L s (y) 6 = ? for all s 2 S. We show that in this case, if Axiom CEB holds then Axiom CEB-2 must be violated.
Take some y 2 B such that x s y s for all x 2 B and then some z 2 L s 0 (y)\L s (y) which is nonempty by the contradiction assumption. Then, since y 2 B we will have max
violates Axiom CEB-2 as claimed. In conclusion, there must exist a state s 2 S that is a negative a¢ne transformation of s .
Proving the necessity of Axiom CEB is straightforward. To see that Axiom CEB-2 must also be satis…ed when the preferences can be represented as in (8) with a …nite state space, take some lottery y 2 int( (Z)) and for each s 2 S, take
Then, by the choice of the set A, we will have fxg fyg for all x 2 A. On the other hand, for any
In the above we used the fact that the restriction of the representation to singletons implies fxg fyg ,
While in the case of a …nite state space, it is su¢cient to show that s must be one of the states from the DLR representation, for the case of an in…nite state space this is not enough. This is because the state s can always be added to the state space and assign a measure zero. Thus, for the proof of the su¢ciency of the axioms for the in…nite state space case, the main challenges are to show that the DLR measure of s is strictly positive and to show the existence of the empty neighborhood of s . The …rst straightforward step in the general proof is to use Axiom CEB to assert the existence of a set b
The main goal of the rest of the proof of su¢ciency is to construct a set b Thus, if we could …nd a set of N 1 linearly independent ex post states in b S 1 with:
(int (hull(fs 1 ; :::; s N 1 g))) > 0
we could then …rst argue inductively using the above Fact that:
\ s2fs 1 ;:::;s N 1 g L s (y) 6 = ?
(see Lemma 25) and then also argue that \ s2hull(fs 1 ;:::;s N 1 g) L s (y) 6 = ? (see Lemma 26). In addition, if we ensure that: s = 2 hull(f s 1 ; :::; s N 1 g)
then again by the above Fact, we would also have that \ s2fs 1 ;:::;s N 1 g L s (y) \ L s (y) 6 = ? and thus be able to take: z 2 \ s2hull(fs 1 ;:::;s N 1 g) L s (y) \ L s (y)
Finally, by letting: b S 5 hull(fs 1 ; :::; s N 1 g)
and selecting z as above, we would achieve the desired result. However, there are two problems with this approach that do not allow the argument to go through as stated. Firstly, since Axiom CEB-2 does not state the existence of a lottery y, but of a set B, the above mentioned Fact is not true if we replace y with the set B. Secondly, since S N is the subset of normalized utilities, …nding N 1 linearly independent values with the desired properties is not immediately obvious, if possible at all.
In order to solve the …rst issue, we will expand the set (Z) to the smallest a¢ne set that contains it, that is to fz 2 R N :
Then, by de…ning the expanded lower contour sets L s (B) fy 2 : y s < z s for all z 2 Bg, we will be able to prove a counterpart of the above Fact (see Lemma 24). While in the end, we will obtain an element z 0 that belongs to the intersection of these expanded sets \ s2 b S 5 L s (B) \ L s (B) (see Lemma 26), since (Z) has a non empty algebraic interior in , we will be able to select a lottery z 2 (Z) that will have the desired properties (see …rst Lemma 17 to see why we may consider without loss of generality that B int( (Z)) in the text of Axiom CEB-2 and then Lemma 27). 18 To solve the second problem, we will expand the set of ex post utilities from the normalized set S N to the set P N = n s 2 R N :
. A …rst e¤ect of this expansion is that the counterpart of the above Fact will have now to be written in terms of convex cones instead of convex hulls (see Lemma 24). But since z 0 2 \ s2fs 1 ;:::;s N 1 g L s (B) \ L s (B) still implies z 0 2 \ s2cone(fs 1 ;:::;s N 1 g) L s (B) \ L s (B) the argument will continue to go through (see Lemma 26). Therefore, we need to …nd N 1 linearly independent utilities in P N such that (int (cone(fs 1 ; :::; s N 1 g)) \ b S 1 ) > 0 and s = 2 cone(f s 1 ; :::; s N 1 g). Then, by letting b S 5 int (cone(fs 1 ; :::; s N 1 g)) \ b S 1 and z be selected as explained above we would complete the argument. We mention here that considering N 1 linearly independent states that would include s would not solve the problem because then the interior of the cone generated by less than N 1 states in the N 1 dimensional space P N would be empty and thus of zero measure. Therefore, the need for the more elaborate construction. Now, using the contradiction assumption (f s g) = 0, we show in Lemma 19 and Lemma 20 that there exists a set b and Lemma 22 show that there exists a set b S 3 b S 2 and > 0 such that s = 2 cone([ s2 b S 3 N (s)), where N (s) is the closed ball of radius around s. In Lemma 23 we construct the set of linearly independent utilities fs 1 ; :::; s N g with the properties presented above. This is done by covering the compact set b S 3 with a …nite partition extracted from a cover of b S 3 whose elements are the intersections of this set b S 3 with the convex cones generated for each s 2 b S 3 by some set of N 1 linearly independent utilities fs s 1 ; :::; s s N 1 g with the property that s 2 int cone fs s 1 ; :::; s s N 1 g . In addition, since s is su¢ciently far away from the set cone([ s2 b S 3 N (s)), as ensured in the Lemma 22, we will have s = 2 cone(f s 1 ; :::; s N 1 g). The proof of the existence of the empty neighborhood around s is presented in Theorem 28. It di¤ers from the proof of the fact that (f s g) > 0 only in the way in which it uses the contradiction assumption in the proof of Lemma 19 as a …rst step in the construction of the set b S 2 . We will present in the Appendix only the part of the argument in which the two proofs are di¤erent.
The necessity part of the proof of Theorem 13 also needs a rather elaborate approach. This is because the in…nite set [ s2S x s , with x s chosen as in the intuitive argument presented above, is not necessarily closed and thus not necessarily compact. Thus, we need to take A = cl([ s2S x s ). But then the fact that we select x s 2 L s (y) for each s 2 S does not necessarily imply fxg fyg for all x 2 A and this invalidates the required conclusion. Part (iii) of the De…nition 9 will help overcome this problem but the construction is still not straightforward. The proof of the necessity will share some steps which are similar to steps from the proof of Theorem 16 and those steps will be presented without proof in the Appendix. However, we emphasize here that while in both proofs the initial steps consist of partitioning some compact set of ex post states into a …nite number of subsets such that the states contained in each subset share some common properties, there is an important di¤erence in terms of the ultimate goal of these arguments. Thus, in the proof of Theorem 16, which is the result that shows that (f s g) > 0, the partitioning of b S 1 was done so that we could in the end claim that one of these subsets, namely b S 5 , must be of strictly positive measure since the measure of the set b S 1 was strictly positive. In the proof of the necessity of Axiom CEB-2, the goal is to partition the set S N nN " ( s ) into a …nite number of subsets, each sharing some common relevant properties, so that we can resolve the problems raised by the in…niteness of the state space. We defer the presentation of the argument to the Appendix. 19 Next, we present an additional result that constitutes the representation theorem for the case of a …nite ex post state space of uncertainty. As argued above, in this case the restriction on preferences given by Axiom CEB-2 is not necessary. To prove the theorem below, it is enough to show that by replacing Axiom CEB-2 with Finiteness, the resulting set of axioms imply Axiom CEB-2. Then the argument from the sketch of the proof of Theorem 13 would complete the proof. Showing that Axiom CEB-2 must be satis…ed in this case can be done by following an argument close to the one used above as the intuitive proof of Theorem 13 for the …nite case.
Theorem 14
The preference has a representation as in (8) with a …nite state space if and only if it satis…es Weak Order, Continuity, Independence, Monotonicity, Axiom CEB and Finiteness.
We close this section with a result that states the uniqueness of the representation for the uncertainty model. This result is important because it allows the interpretation the objects of the representation as intended. Thus, the fact that the parameters of the representation are identi…ed ensures that when observing choice, it is feasible to disentangle the impact on behavior of the context e¤ects from the impact of the presence of subjective uncertainty.
Our representation in (8) is identi…ed by the elements of the set ( ; ) where is a probability over the S N and measures the strength of the behavioral bias. The following theorem shows that both and are identi…ed from preferences.
Theorem 15 Suppose that ( 1 ; 1 ) is a normalized representation of some preferences satisfying Weak Order, Continuity, Independence, Monotonicity, Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2. Then, if ( 2 ; 2 ) is also a normalized representation of we must have 1 = 2 and 1 = 2 .
Proof. See Appendix A3.
Conclusion
This paper studies a model of reference-dependent preferences over menus of lotteries. We extend the model of choices from categories in Barbos (2010) to allow for the presence of some underlying subjective uncertainty between the moment of the choice of a menu and the time a speci…c option within the menu is selected. The axiomatic foundations of this model allow for the disentangling of the context e¤ects bias from the rational desire from ‡exibility that is usually captured by preferences over menus. We identify a weak condition on the set of ex post preferences under which the two e¤ects are distinguishable from each other. We …nd the behavioral implications of both a …nite and an in…nite space of uncertainty. We also provide a new method for putting structure on the set of probabilities on the state space of subjective uncertainty introduced by DLR (2001) when this state space is in…nite, by making it essentially …nite with respect to a certain property.
Appendix

A1. Construction of the state space for the uncertainty model
We present here brie ‡y the construction of the state space from Dekel, Lipman and Rustichini (2001) as we will utilize the concepts introduced there extensively in the rest of the proof.
Firstly, as shown in DLR (2001) under Weak Order, Continuity and Independence any set of lotteries in (Z) is indi¤erent to its convex hull. Thus, we can restrict attention to the set of convex sets 20 in K( (Z)), which we denote from now on with e K( (Z)). Recall that the number of outcomes in Z is denoted by N and that S N is the set of normalized expected utility functions on (Z). De…ne by C(S N ) the set of real-valued continuous functions on S N and endow it with the topology given by the sup-norm metric. Embed e K( (Z)) into C(S N ) by identifying each menu with its support function: A ! A , with A (s) = max x2A P N k=1 x k s k . It is a standard result that the above mapping is an embedding, one-to-one and monotonic. Thus, for all A; B 2 e K( (Z)), A ( ) = B ( ) implies A = B and A B implies A B . The order used on C(S N ) is the usual pointwise partial order. Also the support functional is a¢ne, that is:
Let C denote the subset of C(S N ) that maps e K( (Z)) into, that is C f A 2 C(S N ) : x k s k for all x 2 (Z).
Dekel, Lipman, Rustichini and Sarver (2007) show in the proof of their Theorem 2 that under Monotonicity, the functional W is increasing on the space H = fr 1 1 r 2 2 : 1 ; 2 2 C and 1 ; 2 0g which is dense in C(S N ). Since f jjf jj 1 for any f 2 H , where 1 is the function identically equal to 1, by the monotonicity of W we will have W (f ) jjf jjW (1) so W is bounded on H . Therefore, as in DLR (2001), W can be extended uniquely from C to the whole C(S N ) preserving continuity and linearity. Also, since H is dense in C(S N ), it follows immediately that W will be monotone on the whole C(S N ). As in Royden (1988 
This last step delivers the DLR representation of the preference . However, note that we use here a di¤erent version of the Riesz Representation Theorem than the one used in DLR (2001). This is because the Monotonicity Axiom makes the functional W positive and thus we can obtain a -additive and positive Borel measure as opposed to a …nitely additive and signed measure as in DLR (2001). As it will be seen below, the -additivity of the measure is necessary both for obtaining our reference-dependent representation as well as for proving the uniqueness of this representation. Next, we will impose the additional restrictions on preferences given by Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2 to obtain our speci…c representation from (8) .
A2. Proof of Theorem 13
As a …rst step in the proof, we will rewrite Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2 by using the support functionals and the functional W instead of the preference relation. Note that since v(x) represents the preference over lotteries in (Z), using the results from Appendix B1 we have:
Given two sets A; B 2 e K( (Z)), if there exists y 2 B such that fxg fyg for all x 2 A we will have that fyg ( s ) > fxg ( s ) for all x 2 A so B ( s ) > A ( s ). Thus, in general if there exists a lottery in B that is strictly worse than all lotteries in A we can write this in a compact way as B ( s ) > A ( s ). Similarly, if y is weakly worse than all elements in A, we have B ( s ) A ( s ). Also note that in order for Axiom CEB-2 to hold, more exactly for a lottery y 2 (Z) to exist such that fxg fyg for some other x 2 (Z), we need > 0 since otherwise all elements in (Z) are indi¤erent to each other. Therefore, under Axiom CEB-2 we have B ( s ) > A ( s ) if and only if B ( s ) > A ( s ). Finally, for any two support functionals A ; B 2 C, denote their join by A 
Using these results, the fact that A hull(A) for any A 2 K( (Z)) and the fact that A B i¤ A B , we can write Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2 in the following equivalent forms:
Axiom CEB-2: There exists a set A 2 e K( (Z)) such that A int( (Z)) and a set B 0 2 e K( (Z)) with A B 0 and B 0 ( s ) > A ( s ), such that for all lotteries z 2 (Z) A[fzg) ).
We introduce now some new notation in addition to the one already presented in Section 3. For any set B 2 e K( (Z)), denote its expanded weak lower and upper contour sets corresponding to s i 2 P N by: 
Proof of Su¢ciency in Theorem 13:
We will prove two results, Theorem 16 and Theorem 28, which together will bring us one step away from obtaining the structure on the state space from the DLR representation necessary for writing the representation of W ( ) as in (8) .
Theorem 16 Under axioms CEB and Identi…cation we must have (f s g) > 0.
Proof. Assume by contradiction that (f s g) = 0 and take the set set A 2 e K( (Z)) given by the Axiom CEB-2 with A int( (Z)) and the superset B 0 2 e K( (Z)) of A such that there exists x 2 B 0 nA with fxg ( s ) > A ( s ). Note that in order for such a set B 0 to exist it must be that > 0 so we must also have fxg ( s ) > A ( s ). We will break up most of the rest of the proof of Theorem 16 into a series of lemmas. 
2 int( (Z)) we will …nd some x 0 2 int( (Z)) \ (B 0 nA) with fx 0 g ( s ) > A ( s ) and then de…ne B hull(A [ fx 0 g) and repeat the argument above to prove the …rst part of the claim. Note that since A is closed it must be that A ( s ) = fyg ( s ) for some y 2 A. Also, since s 2 S N , we have s 6 = 0 so y = 2 int(A). Take x 0 = 1 2 (x + y) and note that x 0 2 int( (Z)) \ (B 0 nA). On the other hand, by the a¢ne property of ( ) we have fx 0 g ( s ) = Lemma 19 There exists " > 0 such that ( b S 1 ncone(N " ( s ))) > 0 where N " ( s ) is the closed ball of radius " around s in R N .
Proof. If this were not true we would then have b S 1 ncone N 1 n ( s ) = 0 for all n 1 so:
But cone(f s g) = f ( s ) : 0g and since b S 1 S N in which the utilities are normalized so that
and is -additive we can use for instance Theorem 9.8(ii) in Aliprantis and Border(1999, pp. 337) to conclude that: (f s g) = lim
S 1 > 0 which contradicts the assumption that (f s g) = 0. Thus, the set b S 1 ncone(N " ( s )) will be of strictly positive measure.
Lemma 20 There exists a set b
Proof. Even though s = 2 b S 1 ncone(N " ( s )), we cannot yet claim that s = 2 cone( b S 1 ncone(N " ( s ))). To obtain a set with this property, we will partition b S 2 into 2 N 2 elements constructed as follows. Firstly, note that by the normalization P N k=1 s k = 0 for all s 2 P N , we must have s v 1 = 0, where v 1 (1; :::; 1) 2 R N . Select next some other N 3 vectors such that fv 1 ; v 2 ; :::; v N 2 g is a linearly independent set and s v i = 0, for all i 2 f1; :::; N 2g. Note on the one hand that choosing N 2 such vectors is possible because the dimension of the underlying space P N is N 1. On the other hand, since fv 1 ; v 2 ; :::; v N 2 g are linearly independent, the dimension of the set: R fs 2 P N : s v i = 0; for i 2 f1; :::; N 2gg is 1. Thus, since s 2 R, we have that s 2 R implies s = ( s ) for some 2 R.
Let H 1 fs 2 P N : s v 1 0g and H 2 fs 2 P N : s v 1 0g and then construct iteratively the following sets: H i 1 ;:::;in;1 fs 2 H i 1 ;:::;in : s v n+1 0g, H i 1 ;:::;in;2 fs 2 H i 1 ;:::;in : s v n+1 0g for n = f1; :::; N 3g. Let: S i 1 ;:::;i N 2 H i 1 ;:::;i N 2 \ b S 1 ncone(N " ( s )) for all fi 1 ; :::; i N 2 g 2 f1; 2g N 2 . Note that the 2 N 2 elements S i 1 ;:::;i N 2 thus constructed form a …nite partition of b S 1 ncone(N " ( s )), so since ( b S 1 ncone(N " ( s ))) > 0, one of the elements of the partition which we denote b S 2 must be of strict positive measure. Without loss of generality we may assume that s v i 0 for all s 2 b S 2 and i 2 f1; :::; N 2g. This is because when s v i 0 for some i we may take v 0 i = v i instead of v i and then, except for some notation, the elements of the partition of b S 1 ncone(N " ( s )) will be the same.
We will show now that s = 2 cone( b S 2 ). Assume by contradiction that this is not true, that is there exist fs 1 ; :::; s m g b S 2 and f 1 ; :::; m g 2 R m + such that s = P m i=1 j s j . We may assume without loss of generality that s j 6 = s for any j, because when this is not true we must still be able to write s as a positive combination of the remaining elements from fs 1 ; :::; s m g. Now, for any i 2 f1; :::; N 2g we have s v i = 0, s j v i 0 and s = P m i=1 j s j imply s j v i = 0 for all j 2 f1; :::; mg. Therefore, for any j 2 f1; :::; mg, we have s j v i = 0 for all i 2 f1; :::; N 2g which implies s j 2 R \ S N . But R \ S N = f s ; s g because of the normalization P N k=1 s k 2 = 1 for the elements in S N and of the fact that s 2 R implies s = ( s ) for some 2 R. Since s j 6 = s we must therefore have s j = s for all j which is impossible because s = 2 b S 1 ncone(N " ( s )). This completes the proof of Lemma 20.
We denote by diam(S) supfd(s; s 0 ) : s; s 0 2 Sg the diameter of a nonempty set.
Lemma 21 There exists a closed set b
Proof. We will use Theorem 15 from Royden(1988, pp. 63) which states that if E is a measurable set and " > 0, then there exists a closed set F E such that (EnF ) < ". Since by Lemma 20 we have ( b S 2 ) > 0, there exists " such that ( b S 2 ) > " > 0. Applying the result from Royden, we conclude that there exists a closed set b we conclude that there exists a closed set b
Lemma 22 There exists > 0 such that s = 2 cone([ s2 b S 3 N (s)).
Proof. Assume by contradiction that the claim is not true so that for any n > 1, we have
(s)). Thus, for any n 2, there exist f n i ; r n i g i2f1;:::;p(n)g with n i > 0 and r n
(s) such that s = P p(n) i=1 n i r n i . We …rstly claim that it is without loss of generality to take p(n) = N for all n. To see this, note that:
(s) . By Carathéodory's Convexity Theorem (see for instance Theorem 5.17 from Aliprantis and Border(1999, pp. 173)) in an (N 1)-dimensional vector space, every vector in the convex hull of a nonempty set can be written as a convex combination of at most N vectors from that set. Thus, in our case there exist f n i ; r n i g i2f1;:::; N g with n i > 0 and r n
(s) such that
(s) we have: jjr n i jj jjr n i sjj + jjsjj so it is compact. Since fr n 1 g is a sequence in a compact set, it has a convergent subsequence r n i 1 ! r 0 1 .
Thus, it is without loss of generality to assume that r n 1 ! r 0 1 and then repeating the argument iteratively we can take r n i ! r 0 i for all i 2 f1; :::; N g. We claim that r 0 i 2 b S 3 for all i. To see this, note that if r 0 i = 2 b S 3 for some i, since b S 3 is closed we will have d(r 0 i ; b S 3 ) = > 0. But then, take M 0 such that for any n M 0 we have r n i 2 N 2 (r 0 i ) and let M max(M 0 ; 1 ) + 1.
Next, we show that for any i the real sequence f n i g is bounded so that we can extract some convergent subsequence. Thus, we have s = . Therefore, repeating the argument from above, we may assume without loss of generality that n i ! 0 i 0 for each i 2 f1; :::; N g. But then, the sequence
which is a contradiction and thus the proof of Lemma 22 is complete. 21
Lemma 23 There exists a set of N 1 linearly independent utilities 22 fs 1 ; :::; s N 1 g P N nf0g such that (int(cone(fs 1 ; :::; s N 1 g)) \ b S 3 ) > 0 and s = 2 cone(fs 1 ; :::; s N 1 g).
Proof. For any s 2 P N , denote by s 2 R N 1 the vector consisting of the …rst N 1 coordinates of s. Then, note that
i s i = 0, so …nding N 1 linearly independent elements in P N is equivalent to …nding N 1 linearly independent states in R N 1 . For each i 2 f1; :::; N 1g, let f i (0; :::; 1; :::; 0) 2 R N 1 with 1 on the i th position and e i f i 1 N 1 (1; :::; 1). It is straightforward to show that fe 1 ; :::; e N 1 g is a linearly independent set in R N 1 so it constitutes a basis for R N 1 . For for each i 2 f1; :::; N 1g, let s s i s + s e i for some 0 < s < min( ; 1), where is given by Lemma 22 and note that s =
We claim that for any s 2 b S 3 we can choose s such that the set fs s 1 ; :::; s s N 1 g is linearly independent. For this, we will show that P N 1 i=1 i s s i = 0 must imply i = 0 for all i. Since fe 1 ; :::; e N 1 g is a basis in R N 1 , s = P N 1 i=1 s i e i for some i 2 R. Let
i and 21 Note here that unless we bound p(n) above with N , the argument as presented here does not go through because it may well be that p(n) ! 1 as n ! 1. 22 We emphasize here that the set fs 1 ; :::; s N 1 g is not required to belong to S N , but to P N nf0g. While we could adapt Lemma 24 below to conclude that s n+1 2 hull(f s 1 ; :::; s n g) and then also adapt the rest of the proof of Theorem 16 to avoid using cones and work only with states in S N it is not immediately obvious, if possible at all, in the proof of this Lemma to choose fs 1 ; :::; s N 1 g in S N to satisfy the desired properties. Therefore, the choice to work in the extended state space P N nf0g and use cones instead of convex hulls. 
We will show now that the (N 1) (N 1) coe¢cient matrix of this system has a non-zero determinant D. Thus:
::: 
For the …rst equation, we added rows 2 through N 1 to the …rst row and then factored out the term N 2 N 1 ( s + s ). For the second equation, we subtracted from each row i 2 f2; :::; N 1g, the …rst row multiplied with s i s + s N 1 . Now note that since the only restriction on s is 0 < s < min( ; 1) we can always select s such that s 6 = s so D 6 = 0. Therefore, the system has a unique solution and since i = 0 for i 2 f1; :::; N 1g solves the system, we obtain that fs s 1 ; :::; s s N 1 g is a linearly independent set in R N 1 . Then, for each s s i construct: s s i (s s i;1 ; :::; s s i;N 1 ; (s s i;1 + ::: + s s i;N 1 )) 2 P N and we obtained the N 1 linearly independent states in P N .
We will show now that s 2 int(cone(fs s 1 ; :::; s s N 1 g)), for which since cone(fs s 1 ; :::; s s N 1 g) is a convex set in an Euclidean space it su¢ces to show that s 2 al int(cone(fs s 1 ; :::; s s N 1 g)), the algebraic interior of the set cone(fs s 1 ; :::; s s N 1 g) in P N . Thus, we will show that for any p 2 P N , there exists some s > 0 such that for all 2 [0; s ), we have (1 )s+ p 2 cone(fs s 1 ; :::; s s N 1 g). Since fs s 1 ; :::; s s N 1 g are linearly independent, they form a basis in the N 1 dimensional space P N so p = P N i=1 i s s i with i 2 R. On the other hand, by construction s =
i s s i and noting that for su¢ciently small i 0 for all i, the argument is complete. Employing the procedure presented above and using the Axiom of Choice construct the family of sets: F = fint(cone(fs s 1 ; :::; s s N g)) \ b Lemma 24 Let fs 1 ; :::; s n g P N nf0g with n 1 be such that
we must have s n+1 2 cone(f s 1 ; :::; s n g).
Proof. Note that since B is compact, L s i (B) = L s i (z s i ) for some lottery z s i 2 B for all i 2 f1; :::; n + 1g.
and any i 2 f1; :::; ng we will have x s i < q s i z s i s i . Therefore, the condition that
would be also in L s n+1 (B). We will show now that: L s n+1 (q) \ (\ n i=1 L s i (q)) = ? and to this end, assume by contradiction that there exists some y 2 L s n+1 (q) \ (\ n i=1 L s i (q)). Consider the set: V fx 2 : q + (y q) for some > 0g and note for any x 2 V and i 2 f1; :::; ng, we have x s i < q s i because y s i < q s i . Therefore, V \ n i=1 L s i (q) so to prove our claim it is enough to show that V \ L s n+1 (z n+1 ) 6 = ?. For this we need to …nd some > 0 such that (q + (y q)) s n+1 < z n+1 s n+1 . Since q s n+1 > z n+1 s n+1 as stated above and y 2 L s n+1 (q) by the contradiction assumption, any > (q z) s n+1 (q y) s n+1 would satisfy this requirement.
Consider now the following sets: Y 0 fw 2 R n : w 0g
Clearly, Y and Y 0 are closed and convex. We will show next that Y \ int(Y 0 ) = ?. Thus, we want to show that if z s n+1 = q s n+1 then it cannot be that z s i < q s i for all i 2 f1; :::; ng or z s i > q s i for all i 2 f1; :::; ng. We can assume that s i 6 = s n+1 because otherwise we would be done with the proof of the lemma, so what remains to prove is that
The …rst claim follows from the results we obtained above. Thus, note that if this were not true, that is if there exists
is open, we could take a su¢ciently small > 0 such that N (x) \ n i=1 L s i (q). Since x 2 H s n+1 (q), we have that x+(1 )y 2 N (x) \L s n+1 (q) for some y 2 L s n+1 (q) and some su¢ciently small and we would thus obtain a contradiction with the fact that L s n+1 (q) \ (\ n i=1 L s i (q)) = ?. As for the second part of the claim, note that if there exists x 2 H s n+1 (q)\ (\ n i=1 U s i (q)) we would have x s i > q s i for all i 2 f1; :::; ng and x s n+1 = q s n+1 . Consider then the element x 0 = q + (q x) for some > 0. We will then have x 0 s i < q s i for all i n and x 0 s n+1 = q s n+1 so x 0 2 H s n+1 (q)\ (\ n i=1 L s i (q)) which we know that cannot hold by the …rst part of the claim and thus we are done.
Given that Y and Y 0 are closed and convex and Y \ int(Y 0 ) = ? we can use the Separating Hyperplane Theorem to obtain that there exists a vector 2 R n nf0g and a number k 2 R such that such that w k for all w 2 Y and w k for all w 2 Y 0 . But since ((q q) s 1 ; :::; (q q) s n ) 2 Y \ Y 0 we must have k = 0 = 0. Also, note that for any w 2 Y we have w 2 Y so w 0 and ( w) 0 so w = 0. Moreover, note that since w k = 0 for all w 2 Y 0 we must have 0. Therefore, we obtained that for any z 2 H s n+1 (q), that is for any z 2 with (z q) s n+1 = 0 we must have: (z q) ( 1 s 1 + ::: + n s n ) = 0. Then, denoting as above by s i the elements of R N 1 consisting of the …rst N 1 coordinates of s i and using for instance Theorem 5.81 from Aliprantis and Border (1999, pp. 207) , we have that s n+1 = ( 1 s 1 + ::: + n s n ) for some 2 R and then s n+1 = ( 1 s 1 + ::: + n s n ). From the fact that s n+1 2 P N nf0g it follows that 6 = 0. Since (\ n i=1 L s i (q)) \ L s n+1 (q) = ? we must also have < 0 so s n+1 = P n i=1 i s i with i i 0 and the proof of the Lemma 24 is complete.
Proof. We will prove the lemma by induction. Clearly, we have L s 1 (B) 6 = ? so assume that \ n i=1 L s i (B) 6 = ? and by contradiction that \ n+1 i=1 L s i (B) = ?. By Lemma 24, it would follow that s n+1 2 cone(f s 1 ; :::; s n g) so s n+1 = P n i=1 i ( s i ) with i 0. But then, s n+1 + P n i=1 i s i = 0 which contradicts the fact that fs 1 ; :::; s n+1 g are linearly independent. Therefore, we must have \ n+1 i=1 L s i (B) 6 = ? and this completes the induction proof.
Lemma 26 There exists a set b 
it follows that: z 0 2 \ s2cone(fs 1 ;:::;s N 1 g) L s (B). To see this, note …rstly that z 0 s i < x s i for all x 2 B and for each i. Take some s = P N 1 i=1 i s i with i 0 for all i. Then for any x 2 B we will have z 0 s = Proof. Since B is compact we have U s (B) = U s (fz 00 g) for some z 00 2 B. Since B int( (Z)) we have z 00 2 int( (Z)) so there exists: z z 00 + (1 )z 0 2 int( (Z) for some su¢ciently high < 1. Since z 0 2 U s (B) we will have B ( s ) < z 0 ( s ). On the other hand, by choice of z 00 we have z 00 ( s )
x We will complete now the proof of Theorem 16. Thus, consider the sets A [ fzg and B [ fzg and we want to show that we must have: W ( hull(B[fzg) ) > W ( hull(A[fzg) ) which would be su¢cient to exclude the case when (f s g) = 0. To see this, note that A[fzg) ). This contradicts Axiom CEB-2 because B 0 was chosen arbitrarily from those sets satisfying the requirements of the axiom. Thus, we have:
where the weak inequality comes from the fact that A B so B (s) A (s) for all s. The strict inequality comes from the fact that for any s 2 b
. Therefore, we must have: (f s g) > 0 and thus the proof of Theorem 16 is complete.
Theorem 28 Under axioms CEB and Identi…cation there exists " > 0 such that (N " ( s )nf s g) = 0.
Proof. Most steps in the proof of this theorem are identical to steps from the proof of the previous theorem so we will present in detail only the step at which the two proofs di¤er. Assume Axiom CEB is satis…ed and by contradiction that the statement of Theorem 28 is false. Thus, for any " > 0 we have (N " ( s )nf s g) > 0. Repeat the steps from Lemmas 17-18 in the proof of Theorem 16 to construct the open set b
We will next show that the result from Lemma 19 is true in this case as well. 23 Then, the rest of the proof will go through as above and thus we would conclude that Axiom CEB-2 is violated which would constitute the contradiction. We have s 2 b S 1 and we claim that there exists " > 0 such that b S 1 ncone(N " ( s )) > 0
where N " ( s ) is the closed ball of radius " around s in R N . If this were not true we would then have b S 1 ncone N 1 n ( s ) = 0 for all n 1. Note that
S 1 n f s g because cone(f s g) \ b S 1 = f s g as argued in the proof of the Lemma 19 from Theorem 16. So, we can use Theorem 9.8(i) in Aliprantis and Border (1999, pp. 337) We complete now the proof of the su¢ciency of the Axioms. Using (21) for any A 2 e K( (Z)), we can write:
In particular, for A = fzg we will have: so using (29) we get:
In conclusion, since W ( A ) = V (A) and A hull(A), for any A 2 K( (Z)) we get the desired normalized reference-dependent representation: Note that since (f s g) > 0 by Theorem 16 and > 0 we will have 2 (0; 1). Also, since we have (N " ( s )nf s g) = 0 by Lemma 28 it follows that: e (N " ( s )) = e (N " ( s )nf s g) + e (f s g) = (N"( s )nf s g) (S N ) (f s g) = 0 and thus condition (iii) from De…nition 9 is also satis…ed. This completes the su¢ciency part of the proof of Theorem 13.
Proof of Necessity in Theorem 13:
We show next that the a preference relation which can be represented by a utility function as in (8) must satisfy Weak Order, Continuity, Independence, Monotonicity, Axiom CEB and Axiom CEB-2. The fact that the preference will satisfy the …rst three of the axioms is true because the representation in (8) is just a particular form of a DLR representation which implies those axioms. Also, given the equivalent representation in (2) it is clear that the preference must also satisfy Monotonicity and it is straightforward to show the necessity of Axiom CEB. Therefore, it remains to show that Axiom CEB-2 must also be satis…ed.
The following lemma will constitute the main step of the argument. Note …rstly that by part (iii) of the representation in (8), there exists " > 0 such that (N " ( s )) = 0.
Lemma 29 When the preferences admit a normalized reference-dependent representation as in (8) , there exist a compact set A 0 int( (Z)) and a lottery y 2 int( (Z)) such that fyg ( s ) > A 0 ( s ) and A 0 (s) > fyg (s) for all s 2 S N nN " ( s ).
Proof. Firstly, since s = 2 S N ncone(N " ( s )) we can use an argument similar to the one from the proof of Lemma 20 from Theorem 16 to cover S N nN " ( s ) with 2 N 2 elements fS 1 ; :::; S 2 N 2 g such that s = 2 cone(S j ) for any j. By taking their closures, we can assume that the elements are all closed sets. Then, using the approach from Lemma 21, we can partition each S j to obtain a cover of S N nN " ( s ) with elements indexed by a …nite set J, such that diam(S j ) for some < 1 2 and all j 2 J. Again, by taking closures we can assume that S j are closed for all j. Next, as in Lemma 22 we can show that for each j 2 J there exists j > 0 such that for each j we have s = 2 cone([ s2S j N j (s)). Thus, as in Lemma 23 we can …nd a cover of S j with a …nite family of sets of the form fint(cone(fs 1;i ; :::; s N 1;i g)) \ S j g i2I j such that for any i 2 I j , fs 1;i ; :::; s N 1;i g are linearly independent and s = 2 int(cone(fs 1;i ; :::; s N 1;i g)). Let j(i) be the index j such that i 2 I j and let I [ j2J I j . Note that by construction, I is a …nite set. Take some arbitrary lottery y 2 int( (Z)).
For each i 2 I, since fs 1;i ; :::; s N;i g are linearly independent we can employ Lemma 24 as in the proof of Lemma 25 from Theorem 16 to conclude that \ N 1 k=1 L s k;i (y) 6 = ? and then immediately that \ N 1 j=1 L s k;i (y) 6 = ?. Therefore, using again Lemma 24 for the set f s 1;i ; :::; s N 1;i g and s we will have that \ N 1 k=1 L s k;i (y) \L s (y) 6 = ? so \ N 1 k=1 U s k;i (y) \ L s (y) 6 = ? because L s k;i (y) = U s k;i (y). Now, for each i 2 I, take x 0 i 2 \ N 1 k=1 U s k;i (y) \ L s (y) and note that by an argument similar to the one from Lemma 26 we will have: x 0 i 2 \ s2int(cone(fs 1;i ;:::;s N 1;i g))\S j(i) \(S N nN " ( s )) U s (y) \ L s (y). Since x 0 i as chosen above is not necessarily in (Z) consider the set f x 0 i + (1 )y : 2 (0; 1)g and note that since y 2 int( (Z)) which is algebraically open, for a small enough we will have x i x 0 i + (1 )y 2 int( (Z)). In addition, since ( On the other hand, the family fint(fcone(fs 1;i ; :::; s N 1;i g)) \ S j(i) \ S N nN " ( s ) g i2I being a cover of S N nN " ( s ), for any s 2 S N nN " ( s ) we will have s 2 int(cone(fs 1;i ; :::; s N 1;i g))\S j(i) for some i 2 I. Therefore, A 0 (s) fx i g (s) > fyg (s) which completes the proof of the Lemma 29.
Let A hull(A 0 ) and B hull(A[ y), where A 0 and y are given by the Lemma 29 and we will show that A and B thus de…ned will satisfy the conditions of Axiom CEB-2 from Appendix B which we already proved that is equivalent to Axiom CEB-2. Firstly, since fyg ( s ) > A 0 ( s ) it follows that:
(33) where we employed repeatedly the fact that C ( ) = hull(C) ( ). Using similar steps and the monotonicity of ( ) (s), it can be shown that A 0 (s) > fyg (s) implies A (s) = B (s) for s 2 S N nN " ( s ). Secondly, we want to show that for any lottery z 2 (Z) with fzg ( s ) B ( s ), we have W ( hull(B[fzg) ) = W ( hull (A[fzg) ). This completes the proof of the necessity of the axioms for the representation. We mention here that this slightly elaborate construction of the set A is necessary. Thus, note that it would have not been enough to select a lottery x s 2 U s (y) \ L s (y) for each s 2 S N nN " ( s ) appealing to the Axiom of Choice and then de…ne A cl [ s2S N nN " ( s ) x s . This is because x s 2 L s (y) for all s 2 S N nN " ( s ) would not necessarily imply sup x2A (x ( s )) < y ( s ) as needed in order to show the required condition that fyg ( s ) > A ( s ). On the other hand, \ s2S N nN " ( s ) U s (y) is in general not necessarily nonempty so we cannot just take an element in the intersection of this set with L s (y) and let A be that element. An alternative approach would be to take some element y 0 2 L s (y) \ int( (Z)) and then to try take elements x s 2 U s (y) \ L s (y 0 ) with the aim of obtaining the strict condition fyg ( s ) > fy 0 g ( s ) A ( s ). However, this approach also runs into problems because even though U s (y) \ L s (y 0 ) 6 = ? we cannot insure in general that U s (y) \ L s (y 0 ) \ (Z) 6 = ? as necessary to obtain A (Z).
A3. Proof of Theorem 15
Since the preferences satisfy Weak Order, Independence and Continuity, Theorem 2 in DLR (2001) shows that the function that represents these preferences must be unique up to an a¢ne transformation. Thus, if V i (A) = If v i (z) V i (fzg) are the corresponding restrictions to the singletons, we must have v 1 = v 2 + . As argued in Appendix A1, for each i 2 f1; 2g there exists s i 2 S N and i 0 such that v i (z) = i (z s i ) for all z 2 (Z). Moreover, as argued in Appendix A2, we must have i > 0. Therefore, for any z 2 (Z) we have 1 (z s 1 ) = 2 (z s 2 ) + . Because of the normalization P N k=1 s k = 0 in S N , if we take z = ( 1 N ; :::; 1 N ) 2 (Z) we have z s i = 0. Thus, 1 (z s 1 ) = 2 (z s 2 ) + implies = 0.
Therefore, z ( 1 s 1 ) = z ( 2 s 2 ) for any z 2 (Z) which in turn implies that 1 s 1 = 2 s 2 . To see this, for each k 2 f1; :::; N g take z k = (0; :::; 0; 1; 0; :::; 0) 2 (Z) with the 1 on k th position and note that z k ( 1 s 1 ) = z k ( 2 s 2 ) implies ( 1 s 1 ) k = ( 2 s 2 ) k where by (w) k we denote the k th coordinate of a …nite dimensional vector w. Thus, s 1 is an a¢ne transformation of s 2 which immediately implies that s 1 = s 2 , because s i 2 S N for i 2 f1; 2g and we know that S N contains the unique normalization of any a¢ne function. On the other hand, as shown in Sarver (2008) shows that this implies that 1 = 2 . But 1 and 2 are both normalized to be probability measures so it must be that = 1 and then 1 = 2 . Finally, = 1 together with 1 s 1 = 2 s 2 and s 1 = s 2 imply 1 = 2 . Now, recall that at the end of the su¢ciency part of the proof of Theorem 13 we used the elements of the DLR representation to de…ne the elements of our normalized referencedependent representation. More speci…cally, with a slight abuse of notation we have i i (f s i g)
i + i (f s i g) and e i (ds) i (ds) i (S N ) i (f s i g) for i 2 f1; 2g. Since s 1 = s 2 , 1 = 2 and 1 = 2 it follows that 1 = 2 and e 1 = e 2 which completes the proof of Theorem 15.
